Using new establishment-by-occupation microdata, we show that the use of discretionary wage setting significantly expanded in 1970s and 1980s. Increasingly, wages for blue-collar workers were not standardized by job title or seniority but instead subject to managerial discretion. When establishments abandoned pay rates, fell, particularly lowest-paid a those previously paid above market rates. ...

We design three field experiments to estimate how workers' social preferences toward their employer motivates work effort. vary the pay rates offered workers, return employer, and generosity demonstrated via unexpected gifts. Workers exert effort even without private incentives, but is insensitive employer. This consistent with “warm glow” not pure altruism. The gifts have no effect on producti...

ABSTRACT We study the profit effects and interplay of two core accounting practices in a field experiment large retail chain. In 2 × factorial design, we vary (1) whether store managers obtain decision-facilitating information on metric (2) they receive performance pay based same metric. find that both increase profits significantly. contrast to reasoning standard economic theory, do not comple...

While compensation accounts for roughly 90% of K-12 instructional costs, there is little evidence of rational design in these systems. This chapter reviews the nature of teacher compensation systems in developed economies and research on their performance effects. Since these compensation schemes typically arise out of collective negotiations, this chapter also surveys the smaller literature on...

Climbing the Job Ladder: New Evidence of Gender Inequity An explanation for the gender wage gap is that women are less able or less willing to ‘climb the job ladder.’ However, the empirical evidence on gender differences in job mobility has been mixed. Focusing on a subsample of younger, university-educated workers from an Australian longitudinal survey, we find strong evidence that the dynamic...

A principal can observe both the output and input of an agent who works at a job involving multiple tasks. We provide a simple theory that explains why it may be optimal for the principal to use only output-based incentive contract, even though the principal can monitor the agent’s actions perfectly in all but one task and knows exactly which action is optimal for each task. (JEL: D82, M5, J33)

Using data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ‘shadow prices’ for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers’ intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients from subgroups whose shadow prices increase but select at the margin weaker-performing members from those su...

METHODS. Lens epithelial explants and whole lenses from weanling rats were cultured with TGF-/3,, TGF-j32, or TGF-j33 at concentrations ranging from 0.025 ng/ml to 4 ng/ml for 3 to 5 days. Cataractous changes were monitored daily by phase contrast microscopy and by immunofluorescent detection of cataract markers a-smooth muscle actin and type I collagen. Expression of TGF-/3 was studied by immu...

How much do a manager’s interpersonal skills with subordinates, which we call people management skills, affect employee outcomes? Are managers rewarded for having such skills? Using personnel data from a large, high-tech firm, we show that survey-measured people management skills have a strong negative relation to employee turnover. A causal interpretation is reinforced by research designs expl...

We examine the interaction between risk (uncertainty) and production efficiency in determining pay-performance sensitivity in optimal executive compensation. Particularly, we show that the risk-incentive trade-off is exacerbated (attenuated) as production efficiency increases when the efficiency level is greater (less) than the level of compensation risk. This result suggests that the optimalit...