We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents’ preferences are additive, no such rule exists. JEL Classification: C71, D63, D71.

We examine individuals’ distributional orderings in a number of contexts. This is done by using a questionnaire-experiment that is presented to respondents in any one of seven “flavours” or interpretations of the basic distributional problem. The flavours include inequality, risk, social welfare and justice. The issue of personal involvement in the distributional comparison is explicitly addres...

This paper investigates ethical aggregation of infinite utility streams by representable social welfare relations. We prove that the Hammond Equity postulate and other variations of it like the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle are incompatible with positive responsiveness to welfare improvements by every generation. The case of Hammond Equity for the Future is investigated too. JEL classificatio...

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings. JEL classification...

We characterize a family of r-extended generalized Lorenz dominance quasi-orderings and a family of r-Gini welfare orderings, on the basis of two allegedly “incompatible” axioms for heterogeneous welfare comparisons (Ebert, 1997, Ebert and Moyes, 2003, Shorrocks, 1995), but at the cost of either completeness or separability. JEL classification: D31, D63, I31.

Do the Reciprocal Trust Less? We study the intrapersonal relationship between trust and reciprocity in a laboratory experiment. Reciprocal subjects trust significantly more than selfish ones. This finding raises questions about theories of social preferences which predict that “fairer” players should trust less. JEL Classification: C91, D63

We show how to minimize the probability of misclassifying individuals as being poor or not poor when data on some of their relevant attributes are missing, but an estimate of the population distribution of attributes is available. JEL Classification Codes: D63, I32

We examine the association of income variability both within and across generations based on a heterogeneous growth model of permanent and transitory income in Sweden. Non-parametric regressions reveal that income variability is strongly associated with long-run levels of income, especially for lowand highincome earners, and that it is also strongly associated across generations. JEL Classifica...

In the context of resource allocation on the basis of responsive priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition for the deferred acceptance rule to satisfy a consistency principle. In this note we extend this result to the domain of substitutable priorities, complementing results of Kojima and Manea (2010) and Kumano (2009). JEL classification: D63, C78.

How does gender composition influence team decisions? Our evidence from a group dictator game is: (i) groups are more generous and equalitarian when women are in majority, but (ii) the most generous groups are those with two men and one woman. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: A13; C92; D63; D64; J16