We examine conflict resolution via a random device. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for a fixed prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may agree to allocate the prize by coin flip to avoid the costs of conflict. In equilibrium, risk-neutral agents with relatively symmetric conflict capabilities agree to resolve the conflict by randomization. However, with sufficiently ...

I. THE COMBATANT’S PRIVILEGE IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS ................................... 342 A. Functional Requirements for Belligerency ........................................................................... 345 B. Belligerency Requirements for Regular Armed Forces ........................................................ 348 C. Policy Arguments in Favor of a NIAC Privilege ......

We develop a dynamic principal–agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs, asymmetric risk attitudes, complementary actions by both parties, and inter-temporal adverse selection arising from the agent’s unobservable actions interact to affect optimal dynamic contracts. Our continuous-time formulation of the model, which features both “hidden actions” and “hidden...