This paper analyzes post-socialist industrial development and policy in the Western Balkans through lens of its regional specialization spatial concentration. Against a conceptual framework revolving around place-based policy, using Concentration index (modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index) location coefficients (Balassa index), comparative analysis over three decades (1990–2020) highlights weak...

this paper using generalized roeger's model calculated the lerner index for iranian active industries in 4-digit isic codes during the period 1995-2007. the findings indicate that the lerner index has been between 8 to 16 percent in 38 industries among 131 ones. the index also in different industries shows that more than 50 percent of iranian industries have monopolistic power such that th...

Market power refers to conditions where the providers of a service can consistently charge prices above those that would be established by a competitive market. There are many well known definitions of market power, including indices intended to quantify the degree of market concentration of energy supplies. This paper explores a method by which one of the standard indices in market power analy...

This paper investigates the pricing of differentiated products in a vertical sector, with a focus on the role of industry concentration. We propose concentration indices that extend the classical Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) to include vertical structures that manage differentiated products. We also identify how substitution/complementarity among products affects pricing. We compare our pro...

This paper examines the impact of the concentration of the property insurance industry on economic growth in China. We first compute the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the Chinese property insurance industry and establish a two-step system of generalized methods of moments (Two-Step SYS-GMM) estimation to compute the economic effect using a unique data set from the years 1980 to 2014. The...

In most markets, buyers differ in their ability or willingness to switch supplier. This note proposes a novel industry concentration measure that takes this heterogeneity into account. The index increases the share of captive sales, coincides with Hirschman–Herfindahl Index when none are captive, and ”pure monopoly” value 1 all captive.

When major investors own shares in multiple firms in the same industry, the cross ownership changes competitive interests and moves the equilibrium closer to the monopoly solution. In the presence of cross ownership, the traditional measure of industry concentration, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, fails to accurately reflect the level of competition in the market. We extend the literature on c...