The transferable utility (TU) cooperative games are used as an effective mathematical representation of cooperation and coalitions forming. This contribution deals with a modified form of such games in which the expected pay-offs of coalitions are known only vaguely, where the vagueness is modelled by means of fuzzy quantities and some other fuzzy set theoretical concepts. Such games were inves...

We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Wea...

In the classical model of games with transferable utility one assumes that each subgroup of players can form and cooperate to obtain its value. However, we can think that in some situations this assumption is not realistic, that is, not all coalitions are feasible. This suggests that it is necessary to raise the whole question of generalizing the concept of transferable utility game, and theref...

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions t...

The reduced game relevant for the consistency of the prekernel is used to reinterpret this solution concept in a way that makes it independent of interpersonal utility comparisons. Based on this reinterpretation, a non-cooperative model is presented that yields in stationary equilibria the prekernel (kernel) for the class of monotonic transferable utility games. Next, we apply the same non-coop...

The Maschler–Owen consistent value for non-transferable utility games is axiomatized, by means of a marginality axiom. JEL Classification: C7, D7