نتایج جستجو برای: franchise contract contractual information pre

تعداد نتایج: 1468916  

Journal: :حقوق خصوصی 0
فخرالدین اصغری آقمشهدی استادیار دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه مازندران حمیدرضا ابوئی کارشناس ارشد حقوق خصوصی، دانشگاه مازندران

“good faith” as one of the ethical rules has found an important position in contract law. in many countries, good faith is regarded as a mandatory rule to be respected in formation, performance and interpretation of contracts. good faith is a fundamental principle in almost all civil law countries. this article deals only with good faith in formation of contract. the duty to observe good faith ...

2006
Eduardo Engel

Infrastructure concessions are frequently renegotiated after investments are sunk, resulting in better contractual terms for the franchise holders. This paper offers a political economy explanation for renegotiations that occur with no apparent holdup. We argue that they are used by political incumbents to anticipate infrastructure spending and thereby increase the probability of winning an upc...

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2010
Florian Herold

This paper shows how the fear of signaling distrust can endogenously lead to incomplete contractual agreements. According to standard results in contract theory an optimal incentive contract should be conditional on all verifiable information containing statistical information about an agent’s action or type. Most real world contracts, however, condition only on few contingencies and often no e...

Since the national wealth of oil-rich countries including Iran is connected to petroleum resources, these countries attempt to make their fiscal regimes and licensing system more attractive to international oil companies and investors. On the oil company side risks and uncertainties in oil and gas exploration and production are important challenges when deciding between different projects. This...

Journal: :Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 2014

Journal: :International Journal of Law, Government and Communication 2020

2004
Thomas Ehrmann Georg Spranger

Typical contracts assign both coercive and non-coercive means of power to the principal’s side, providing the agent with a comparably small range of countervailing anti-power. Initially agents are therefore vulnerable to opportunistic principal behavior and will rationally anticipate this threat upon signing a contract. In this paper we analyze various forms of power and explain their asymmetri...

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