Intense controversy surrounds the question of when children first understand that others can hold false beliefs. Results from traditional tasks suggest that false-belief understanding does not emerge until about 4 years of age and constitutes a major developmental milestone in social cognition. By contrast, results from nontraditional tasks, which have steadily accumulated over the past 10 year...

This experimental study examined the relationship between pretend play and false-belief. Eighteen-month-old children engaged in pretend play with an experimenter using various controlled behaviors and performed a false-belief task. The results showed that the children who understood pretend play performed better on the false-belief task. This suggests that pretended play and false-belief are re...

To test young children's false belief theory of mind in a morally relevant context, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, children (N = 162) at 3.5, 5.5, and 7.5 years of age were administered three tasks: prototypic moral transgression task, false belief theory of mind task (ToM), and an "accidental transgressor" task, which measured a morally-relevant false belief theory of mind (M...

Belief reasoning plays a central role in making inferences about other people's mental states. The ability to reason about false beliefs is considered as a critical test for having a Theory of Mind (ToM). There is some controversy as to whether it is the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) or the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) that is centrally involved in belief reasoning. According to developmen...

Abstract Narrative ability is an important life-skill and mature narrators do not only provide information about actions events when telling a story but also include the motivations, emotions beliefs experienced by protagonists. It rare for young children to spontaneously explain of characters reasons are unclear. In current study, frog data from 143 Swedish aged 4–6 showed that children’s leve...

We explore the developmental paradox of false belief understanding. This paradox follows from the claim that young infants already have an understanding of false belief, despite the fact that they consistently fail the elicited-response false belief task. First, we argue that recent proposals to solve this paradox are unsatisfactory because they (i) try to give a full explanation of false belie...