Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives’ behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers etc. We analyse the nature of (implicit) retention contracts boards use to discipline and screen execut...

Our review of the evidence found that the notion that higher pay leads to the selection of better executives is undermined by the prevalence of poor recruiting methods. Moreover, higher pay fails to promote better performance. Instead, it undermines the intrinsic motivation of executives, inhibits their learning, leads them to ignore other stakeholders, and discourages them from considering the...

Studies have claimed that smartphone has generated both positive and negative consequences associated with its use by executives, who are most of the time unaware of them. Moreover, the influence of gender on the emergence of paradoxes accrued from smartphone use is something new in the Information Systems realm. Thus, this article aims at probing the role of gender in the emergence of paradoxe...

We examine the distribution of incentives across executives with explicit divisional responsibilities, those with broad oversight authority over the firm, and CEOs. Oversight executives have pay-performance incentives that are $1.22 per thousand dollar increase in shareholder wealth higher than those of divisional executives. For CEOs, incentives are $5.65 per thousand higher than for executive...

In recent years a number of organisations have implemented executive information systems (EIS) in order to improve the performance of their executives’ jobs. Although the use of EIS is important in executives’ work, the majority of executives are unwilling to use EIS applications because of their design flaws. By using social factors, habits and facilitation condition variables from Triandis’ f...