We experimentally examine equilibrium refinements in static and dynamic binary choice games of complete information with strategic complementarities known as “entry” games. Examples include speculative attacks, bank runs and refinancing decisions by multiple lenders. We explore behavior when the value of a payoff relevant state variable is known to all players in advance of making their action ...

The epistemic program can be viewed as a methodical construction of game theory from its most basic elements—rationality and irrationality, belief and knowledge about such matters, beliefs about beliefs, knowledge about knowledge, and so on. To date, the epistemic field has been mainly focused on game matrices and trees—i.e., on the non-cooperative branch of game theory. It has been used to pro...

In this study, considering the importance of how to exploit renewable natural resources, we analyzea shing model with nonlinear harvesting function in which the players at the equilibrium pointdo a static game with complete information that, according to the calculations, will cause a wasteof energy for both players and so the selection of cooperative strategies along with the...

In the last lecture, we saw an example of reputation analysis in repeated interaction (a sequential entry game) with one long-lived player and many short-lived players, where the short-lived players are unsure of the long-lived player’s type. In this lecture, we generalize that analysis by giving an overview of the key results on reputation in repeated games with one long-lived player and many ...

I study games where players may be unaware of some fundamentals of the game itself, such as actions or players, and such unawareness may be lifted by other players’ actions during the play. Based on Li (2006a, 2006b), I propose a framework to deal with such games using standard tools of game theory, including generalization of familiar solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium and sequential e...