Considering dynamic, heterogeneous and autonomous characteristics of computing resources in grid computing systems and the flexibility and effectivity of economics methods applied to solve the problem of resource management, a double auction mechanism for resource allocation on grid computing systems is presented. Firstly, a market model of double auction is described, in which agents are utili...

There are many different ways to allocate resources in cloud computing. The economic methods are some of common ways to resource allocation. The auction-based method has some advantages compared with Fixed-Price method. The double combinatorial auction is one of the proper ways of resource allocation in cloud computing. Resource allocation in double combinatorial auction includes two phases. Th...

In this paper we consider the problem of designing a mechanism for double auctions where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit of a single commodity. We assume that each bidder’s utility value for the item is private to them and we focus on truthful mechanisms, ones where the bidders’ optimal strategy is to bid their true utility. The profit of the auctioneer is the difference between the to...

Double auction markets have consistently been shown to realize almost full efficiency and prices very near the theoretical prediction. Research typically focuses on the performance of the double auction in single market environments. However, real economic activity is coordinated across multiple markets, a far more complex task. This paper uses experimental methods to examine the double auction...

This paper proposes a simple descriptive model of discrete-time double auction markets for divisible assets. As in the classical models exchange economies, we consider finite set agents described by their initial endowments and preferences. Instead Walrasian-type market models, however, assume that all trades take place centralized where communicate through sealed limit orders buying selling. W...

We show why the failure of the affiliation assumption prevents the double auction from achieving efficient outcomes when values are interdependent. This motivates the study of an ascending price version of the double auction. It is shown that when there is a sufficiently large, but still finite, number of sellers, this mechanism has an approximate perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which traders c...

Following the multistage design approach, we propose two asymptotically efficient truthful double auction mechanisms, the BC-LP mechanism and the MBC mechanism, for an exchange market with many buyers and sellers. In this market, each buyer wants to procure a bundle of commodities and each seller supplies one unit of a commodity. Furthermore, various transaction-related costs will be incurred w...

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain, provides the first framework that allows a truthful dynamic double auction (DA) to be construct...

This paper studies the impact of second-order uncertainty on the (ex-post) efficiency of the 0.5-double auction. We consider a discrete double auction model in which the seller’s valuation is either vs or vs and the buyer’s valuation is either vb or vb with 0 = vs < vb < vs < vb = 1. The buyer’s valuation and the seller’s valuation are private information. We further assume that the buyer’s bel...