We document a decline in the frequency of shopping trips United States since 1980 and consider its implications for measurement consumption inequality. A as households stock up on storable goods (i.e., inventory behavior) will lead to rise expenditure inequality when latter is measured at high frequency, even underlying unchanged. find that most recently documented 1980s can be accounted by thi...

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (PérezCastrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents. JEL Classification numbers: C72, D50, D63.

Transferrins bind ferric ion and deliver the iron to cells. The mechanism of the iron release has been studied kinetically, in vitro, with the aid of single point mutants in which the iron-binding ligand, Asp63 (aspartic acid-63, D63), has been changed to Ser, Asn, Glu and Ala. Iron release from the unmutated N-lobe of human serum transferrin (hTF/2N) by EDTA is influenced by a variety of facto...

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical due considerations diversity in school choice, or scheduling course allocation; and other forms needed model, for example, the market roommates, combinatorial assignment problems, knapsack Constraints give rise pecuniary externalities, which ...

In this paper we explore the notion that players are “decent” in the sense that their choices are bounded by certain unwritten social rules. We apply this idea to problems of Bankruptcy and Implementation. JEL Classification: D78, D63

We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and public representing the welfare of other species. show that a social evaluator cannot be egalitarian with respect to while always respecting humans’ unanimous preferences. One solution is preferences only when doing so does not lead decrease Social satisfying these properties reveal surprising connections between concerns ...

This paper investigates fair (i.e., envy-free and efficient) allocations in an overlapping generations economy without production with two-period lived agents. We show that there is a conflict between no-envy efficiency when all have identical preferences. crucially depends on the size of given young age consumption initial old generation relative to at golden-rule. then exist non-stationary pr...