[no abstract available]

In this study we investigate some aspects of top management pay in China’s listed firms. While China has embraced many capitalist practices it still retains some vestiges of socialism and this has an impact on the way business executives are rewarded. In particular, the Chinese government wants to maintain social harmony and it believes that differences in pay between managers and workers shoul...

We examine the interaction between risk (uncertainty) and production efficiency in determining pay-performance sensitivity in optimal executive compensation. Particularly, we show that the risk-incentive trade-off is exacerbated (attenuated) as production efficiency increases when the efficiency level is greater (less) than the level of compensation risk. This result suggests that the optimalit...

We estimate an agency model using the payroll records of a copper mine that paid a production bonus to teams of workers. We estimate the cost of incomplete information due to insurance and incentives considerations and the inefficiency caused by the simple form of the incentive contract itself. At the estimated parameters the cost of worker risk aversion (insurance) is of similar magnitude to m...

We examine whether CEO power can explain the vast amount defined benefit pensions received by them. Analyzing a sample of UK firms from 2003 to 2006, we find that pensions constitutes of almost 15% of the average CEO compensation. Statistical analysis shows that the variables representing increased CEO power have a positive influence on pension pay. We also find that the presence of defined ben...

1 An employee injured at work in the UK is able to claim not only no-fault social security benefit from the state under the industrial injuries compensation scheme, but also damages from the employer if liability in tort can be established. Use of one system of compensation does not lead to exclusion from the other; there is no ‘employer privilege’ preventing an employee claiming from both work...