نتایج جستجو برای: contract theory

تعداد نتایج: 819892  

2012
Alex Young

2 Hidden Information, Screening 4 2.1 The Simple Economics of Adverse Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1 First-Best Outcome: Perfect Price Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.1.1 Comparison of type-specific contracts with each other . . . . 6 2.1.1.2 In case it’s been too long since you’ve last done a maximization problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

In the law of contract, one of the effects of contract breach by one party is right of another party in resorting to sanctions (remedies) resulting from the contract breach. But when this right is applicable that, on principle, the due date for performance of contract has been arrived and the promisor dose not performed his contractual obligations. But, occasionally, prior to the due date for p...

Journal: Iranian Economic Review 2016
Khadijeh Nasrollahi Mahdi Toghyani Morteza Derakhshan

Abstract This article aims to provide theoretical model for analyzing challenge of asymmetric information in the third sector of economy (which is the most important challenge, preventing the growth and development of third sector), using the theoretical foundation of contract theory and incentive theory with regard to the special characteristics of third sector derived by its special structur...

Considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. Considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, Stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. A general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing c...

2014
Alan Schwartz

This Essay considers the substantive and institutional aspects of an economic theory of contract regulation. It lists the various functions that analysts have assigned to contract regulation and briefly discusses the substantive wisdom and institutional feasibility of performing those functions. The essay tentatively concludes that the state should enforce contracts, supply vocabularies that ar...

Journal: :international journal of supply and operations management 2015
mohammad saber fallah nezhad hasan rasay yahya zare mehrjerdi

considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. a general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing c...

This article aims to study lease and hiring contract in the Iranian-Islamic setting and analyze the asymmetric information problem in these contracts. For doing this, we study the characteristics of lease and hiring contracts in Iran (real world experimental characteristics that recognized in other studies), using library method, then we mathematically model different aspects of asymmetric info...

2014
Botond Kőszegi

P and economics—also known as behavioral economics—is a mindset for doing economics that espouses the importance of thinking about the psychological accuracy of models. After a history of identifying deviations from classical approaches, modeling these deviations formally, and empirically establishing their importance in economic decisions, the field is in the process of full integration into e...

Ahmad Makui Fatemeh Farrokhian Iraj Mahdavi

The allocation of risks among the contracting parties in a contract is an important decision affecting the project success. Some risks in a project are uncontrollable; these are imposed to a project by external factors. Since contracting parties can neither control nor affect the occurrence of such risks, their allocation to a party would be inequitable. Therefore the cost overrun related to un...

Journal: :مطالعات حقوق خصوصی 0
احمد مومنی راد استادیار گروه حقوق عمومی دانشکدۀ حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران مهدی تلبا دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد حقوق خصوصی دانشگاه شاهد

when the parties enter into a contract, they are obliged to implement its obligations, but sometimes events occur that make it impossible to execute the contract or runtime status than the time of conclusion of the contract is fundamentally different. these events are referred to as legal excuses if eligible, the parties are exempt from the obligations and responsibilities. the most important l...

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