The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule where, for m candidates, for every vote the first candidate receives m− 1 points, the second m− 2 points and so on. A Borda winner is a candidate with highest total score. It has been a prominent open problem to determine the computational complexity of UNWEIGHTED COALITIONAL MANIPULATION UNDER BORDA: Can one add a certain number of additional ...

Different kinds of decision rules have been successfully implemented under a linguistic approach. This paper aims the same goal for the Borda count, a well-known procedure with some interesting features. In order to this, two ways of extension from the Borda rule to a linguistic framework are proposed taking into account all the agents’ opinions or only the favorable ones for each alternative w...

Many of the small island democracies of the South Pacific are natural laboratories for constitutional and electoral experimentation, but have tended to be ignored by comparative political science research. This article examines one apparently unknown case of electoral innovation from the region: the use of Borda count voting procedures for elections in the Pacific Island states of Nauru and Kir...

An alternative voting system, referred to as probabilistic Borda rule, is developed and analyzed. The winning alternative under this system is chosen by lottery where the weights are determined from each alternative’s Borda score relative to all Borda points possible. Advantages of the lottery include the elimination of strategic voting on the set of alternatives under consideration and breakin...

We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form of two new greedy manipulation algorithms based on intuitions from the bin-packing and multiprocessor scheduling domains. Although we have not been able to show that these algorithms beat existing methods in the worst-c...

Designers routinely rank alternatives in a variety of settings using a staple of comparison, the pairwise comparison. In recent years questions have been raised about the use of such comparisons as a means of calculating and aggregating meaningful preference or choice data. Results on voting have been used to argue that the positional procedure known as the Borda count is the best pairwise voti...

In this article, we have studied the possibility of applying Borda and Fuzzy Borda voting schemes to combine semantic role labeling systems. To better select the correct semantic role, among those provided by different experts, we have introduced two measures: the first one calculates the overlap between labeled sentences, whereas the second one adds different scoring levels depending on the ve...

This paper describes the WSD system developed for our participation to the SemEval-1. It combines various methods by means of a fuzzy Borda voting. The fuzzy Borda votecounting scheme is one of the best known methods in the field of collective decision making. In our system the different disambiguation methods are considered as experts that give a preference ranking for the senses a word can be...

The Borda rule, originally defined on profiles of individual preferences modelled as linear orders over the set alternatives, is one most important voting rules. But rules often need to be used a different format well, such top-truncated orders, where agents rank just their preferred alternatives. What right generalisation rule richer models preference? Several suggestions have been made in lit...

We analyse dominance solvability (by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) of voting games with three candidates and provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the Borda Count to yield a unique winner. We find that Borda is the unique scoring rule that is dominance solvable both (i) under unanimous agreement on a best candidate and (ii) under unanimous agreement on a worst c...