Abstract   Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is typically a cost sharing mechanism and coordinated effort by the channel’s members in order to increase demand and overall profits. In this marketing strategy, the manufacturer shares a fraction of the retailer’s advertising investment. This paper studies the advertising and pricing decisions in a retailer-manufacturer supply chain in which...

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and effici...

Bargaining behavior occupies an important part in economics literature, or social sciences in general. Although there is an extensive simulation literature on social tradeoff in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the one-shot bargaining game, little has been done for the repeated bargaining game. Part of reason for this neglect is that, despite having a continuum of Nash equilibria, under homogeneous s...

This paper shows that the Rubinstein alternating offers model can be modified to provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union-firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the union and the firm engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show th...

We introduce an extension of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and construct, by an elaboration on a voting paradox, a superadditive four-person nontransferable utility game whose extended bargaining set is empty. It is shown that this extension constitutes an upper hemicontinuous correspondence. We conclude that the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-levelled superadditive NTU game may be empty.

Bilateral bargaining has received a lot of attention in the multi–agent literature and has been studied with different approaches. According to the strategic approach, bargaining is modeled as a non–cooperative game with uncertain information and infinite actions. Its resolution is a long–standing open problem and no algorithm addressing uncertainty over multiple parameters is known. In this pa...

Traditional DEA method is improper for supplier evaluation and selection, as it adopts varying weights in evaluation, and fails to consider competition among the suppliers. In order to solve these two problems, Nash bargaining game DEA model is applied to supplier evaluation in present paper. However, there is a non-uniqueness problem with Nash bargaining game efficiency of supplier in existing...

Bilateral bargaining is the most common economic transaction. Customarily, it is formulated as a non-cooperative game with uncertain-information and infinite actions (offers are real-value). Its automation is a long-standing open problem in artificial intelligence and no algorithmic methodology employable regardless of the kind of uncertainty is provided. In this paper, we provide the first ste...