Anonymity and privacy in the electoral process are mandatory features found any democratic society, many authors consider these fundamental civil liberties rights. During election process, every voter must be identified as eligible, but after casting a vote, stay anonymous, assuring vote unlinkability. Voter anonymity most critical issues challenges of almost all electronic voting systems. Howe...

Remote electronic voting has long been considered a panacea for many of the problems with existing, paper-based election mechanisms: assurance that one’s vote has been counted as cast; ability to vote without fear of coercion; fast and reliable tallying; improvement in voter turnout. Despite these promised improvements, take-up of remote electronic voting schemes has been very poor, particularl...

Mu et al. have proposed an electronic voting protocol and claimed that it protects anonymity of voters, detects double voting and authenticates eligible voters. It has been shown that it does not protect voter's privacy and prevent double voting. After that, several schemes have been presented to fulfill these properties. However, many of them suffer from the same weaknesses. In this p...

Some years ago, Juels et al. introduced the first coercion-resistant Internet voting protocol. Its basic concept is still the most viable approach to address voter coercion and vote selling in Internet voting. However, one of the main open issues is its unrealistic computational requirements of the quadratic-time tallying procedure. In this paper, we examine the cause of this issue, namely the ...

This paper presents a new framework for an electronic voting system in which a voter can vote not only from his home poll-site, but from any poll-site, in a manner that guarantees total voter anonymity and privacy. The core concentration of our work is the design of a mechanism in which a voter can be given a receipt to acknowledge his vote and at the same time preventing any occurrence of vote...

Voting in national elections from the comfort of one’s home computer may never be practical or secure, but we argue that remote network voting can be both practical and secure. Provisional and postal absentee ballots, which trade some amount of anonymity for the ability to determine the eligibility of a distant voter, serve as a template for how electronic remote voting might proceed. We propos...

Voter anonymity and voting correctness are important issues for electronic voting mechanisms. Compared electronic voting with traditional 1elections, an electronic voter is able to cast his/her ballot through the Internet in any place and at any time if he/she can access the network. Therefore, convenience and mobility make electronic voting become more and more popular and electronic voting ca...

Formal methods have provided us with tools to check both anonymity of protocols and – more specifically – receipt-freeness of voting protocols. One of the frameworks used for proving anonymity is epistemic logic. However, to the best of our knowledge, epistemic logic has never been used to prove receipt-freeness of voting protocols. Still, the concept of indistinguishability used in formalizing...

Anonymity has been regarded mainly as anonymity of the person who did something. We believe that the anonymity of the subject may not be a primary concern and the more important part would be the fact that the subject did some deed. We focus on the relationship of the subject and the deed. Another argument we raise here is the need of quantitative measures for the anonymity. Anonymity has been ...

The recently proposed Prêt à Voter election scheme uses decryption mixes to achieve anonymity of votes and verifiability of an election while requiring minimal trust in the component of the election system that performs these mixes. However, this scheme still requires trust in several human and machine components; these requirements make the scheme impractical for use in remote voting. To adapt...