Lewis-Skyrms signaling games (Lewis 1969; Skyrms 2010) have been studied under a variety of low-rationality learning dynamics (Barrett 2006; Barrett and Zollman 2009; Huttegger, Skyrms, Smead, and Zollman 2010; Huttegger, Skyrms, Tarrès, and Wagner 2014; Huttegger, Skyrms, and Zollman 2014). Reinforcement dynamics are stable but slow and prone to evolving suboptimal signaling conventions. A low...

Models of bounded rationality often lead to sharper predictions about real world outcomes than their full rationality counterparts. Full rationality in repeated interactions allows a plethora of equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, I examine the effect of bounded rationality in infinitely repeated games. In particular, does the introduction of boundedly rational agents lead to a smaller set of ...

“Football is a very simple game. For 90 minutes, 22 men go running after the ball, and at the end, the Germans win.” Although the game is simple, analyzing it can be hard. Just what makes one team better than another? How much difference do tactics make? Is there really such a thing as a “lucky win”? Here, we try to answer these questions in the context of RoboCup. We take the giant set of log ...