This note shows that oligopolistic loan competition with discriminatory pricing is inefficient when competing banks differ in their ability to screen borrowers: banks with better screening abilities win too small market shares. This result contrasts with a finding by Spence (1976) who showed that an oligopoly with price discrimination achieves first–best efficiency. JEL classification: D43; D82...

This paper analyzes the investment timing for team projects. Under demand uncertainty, it is valuable to maintain flexibility in future investment alternatives. However, one party’s flexibility creates strategic uncertainty for another party, which causes the other party to choose a higher level of flexibility. This strategic complementarity leads to delays in investments in contrast to the cas...

In the recent recession and current economic recovery, policymakers have supported housing prices, expecting that improvement in the balance sheets of banks and consumers will spur economic activity. Considering the period of 1988 through 2006, we document that banks which are active in strong housing markets increase mortgage lending and decrease commercial lending. Firms that borrow from thes...

The purpose of this paper is to examine the financing behaviour of Dutch corporations and its impact on firm performance. First, I present some stylised facts of corporate financing in the Netherlands. I show how the Dutch financial system differs from other major financial systems. Second, I analyse the valuation effect of different types of security offerings made by Dutch quoted firms. An ev...

Alternative payment instruments are studied in an economy with private information, delayed communication, and limited commitment. Attention is restricted to checks and bank drafts, which differ in resource cost and communication characteristics. Checks are less costly but settlement delays create a limited commitment constraint. We Þnd that drafts dominate at low wealths and checks at higher w...

A string of theoretical papers shows that the non-exclusivity of credit contracts generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how these externalities affect the supply of credit. Using internal information on a creditor’s willingness to lend, we find that a creditor reduces its credit supply when a borrower obtains a loan at another creditor (...

We consider agents as a source of welfare for a principal. The principal provides funds, and the benefits produced are known only to the source. If more productive sources are less risk-averse, the principal offers fixed and variable bundles to screen sources. The analysis reveals that the optimal lottery achieves great target efficiency. Indeed, when the ratio of marginal benefits approaches z...