Existence of equilibria is proven for Poisson games with compact type sets and finite action sets. Then three theorems are introduced for characterizing limits of probabilities in Poisson games when the expected number of players becomes large. The magnitude theorem characterizes the rate at which probabilities of events go to zero. The offset theorem characterizes the ratios of probabilities o...

Article history: Received 2 March 2015 Available online 10 July 2015 JEL classification: C70 D44 D60 D82

Definitions of sequential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium are given in games of imperfect recall. Subtleties regarding the definition are discussed. JEL Classification numbers: C70, D81.

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