This paper provides a game-theoretic model of probabilistic voting and then examines the incentives faced by candidates in a spatial model of elections. In our model, voters’ strategies form a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), which merges strategic voting and probabilistic behavior. We first show that a QRE in the voting game exists for all elections with a finite number of candidates, and t...

Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) has become a popular alternative to the standard Nash equilibrium concept in game theoretic applications. It is well known that human subjects do not regularly choose Nash equilibrium strategies. It has been hypothesized that subjects are limited by strategic uncertainty or that subjects have broader social preferences over the outcome of games. These two fact...

An Electronic voting (E-voting) system is a voting system in which the election data is recorded, stored and processed primarily as digital information. E-voting may become the quickest, cheapest, and the most efficient way to administer election and count vote since it only consists of simple process or procedure and require a few worker within the process. The main task of this paper is to in...

We describe a continuous-speech interface for Quick Medical Reference (QMR), which allows physicians to input spoken descriptions of physical-examination findings, or observations. We analyze the difficulties in designing a continuous-speech interface for systems that use medical terminology. We present a method for matching spoken findings names expressed in natural language to QMR terms. The ...

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurate...

This paper studies the effects of increasing the number of sellers on Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) prices in homogeneous product Bertrand oligopoly markets. We show that the two most commonly used choice functions (power and logistic) lead to qualitatively different comparative-static predictions with respect to the relationship between number of firms and prices. JEL Numbers: C73, D83, L13

This paper presents an experiment that evaluates the effect of financial incentives and complexity in political science voting experiments. To evaluate the effect of complexity we adopt a level-k reasoning model concept. This model by Nagel [1] postulates that players might be of different types, each corresponding to the level of reasoning in which they engage. Furthermore, to postulate the ef...