We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we define the complexity of a sequence by its s...

Ravindra Bapat We consider two-person zero-sum games, or matrix games, in which the pure strategies of the players are the vertices, or the edges of a graph, and the payoff is determined by the incidence structure. We identify some cases where the value and the optimal strategies can be explicitly determined. In particular, we consider the incidence matrix game in which the payoff matrix is the...

In this paper, a hide-and-search game with the risk criterion is investigated. The target space consists of n discrete regions and each region is characterized by the searching cost, the detection rate per unit searching effort and the reward when the target is detected. At the beginning of the game, a target selects a region so as to maximize the expected risk of the search and hides himself i...

We show that the following problem is EXP-complete: given a rational v and a two player, zero-sum Boolean gameG determine whether the value of G is at least v. The proof is via a translation of the proof of the same result for Boolean circuit games in [1]. 1 Preliminaries We will be using the encoding of [2] to replicate the proof of [1]. A familiarity with [2] will make the proof much easier t...

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero sum game. In this case, the mixed equilibrium is also globally asymptotically stable. Global convergence to the set of perturbed equilibria is s...

Baccara banque is a three-person zero-sum game parameterized by θ ∈ (0, 1). A study of the game by Downton and Lockwood claimed that the Nash equilibrium is of only academic interest. Their preferred alternative is what we call the independent cooperative equilibrium. But this solution exists only for certain θ. A third solution, which we call the correlated cooperative equilibrium, always exis...

In this lecture we will discuss 2-player zero sum games. Such games are completely competitive , where whatever one player wins, the other must lose. Examples of such games include chess, checkers, backgammon, etc. We will show that in such games: • An equilibrium always exists; • All equilibrium points yield the same payoff for all players; • The set of equilibrium points is actually the carte...

For two-person, zero-sum games where the probability of each player winning is a continuous function of time and is known to both players, the mutually optimal strategy for proposing and accepting a doubling of the game value is known. We present an algorithm for deriving the optimal doubling strategy of a player who is aware of the sub-optimal strategy followed by the opponent. We also present...

This study presents a method to determine weights of objectives in multi objective linear programming without decision maker/s preference. The method is developed by modifying Belenson and Kapur’s approach under fuzziness. It is used two-person zero-sum game with mixed strategies. Degree of linear membership functions of objectives are used in pay-off matrix. The proposed method is shown with a...

We examine a solution concept, called the “value,” for n-person strategic games. In applications, the value provides an a-priori assessment of the monetary worth of a player’s position in a strategic game, comprising not only the player’s contribution to the total payoff but also the player’s ability to inflict losses on other players. A salient feature is that the value takes account of the co...