This paper studies voting in corporate director elections. We construct a comprehensive data set of 2,058,788 mutual fund votes over a two-year period. We find systematic heterogeneity in voting: some funds are consistently more management-friendly than others. We also establish the presence of peer effects: a fund is more likely to oppose management when other funds are more likely to oppose i...

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers’ strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative ma...

Using ordinary calculus techniques, we investigate the conditions under which LeChatelier eeects are signable for nite changes in parameter values. We show, for example , that the short run demand for a factor is always less responsive to price changes than the long run demand, provided that the factor of production and the xed factor do not switch from being substitutes to being complements (o...

For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities we provide a constructive proof of the existence of a greatest and a least Bayes-Nash equilibrium, each one in strategies monotone in type, if the payoff to a player displays increasing differences in own action and the profile of types and if the posteriors are increasing in type with respect to first-order stochastic dominance (e.g., if types ...

We introduce a new class of cooperative games by using the notion of local supermodularity. Therefore locally convex games can be considered as relaxations of convex games. Cooperative games with the unit marginal worth property are defined and characterizations of locally concave (convex) games with this property are proved. Moreover, we obtain a characterization of a subclass of locally conca...

A game with single-valued best-replies and a unique PSNE is a best-reply potential game if and only if the sequential best-reply dynamics converge (Cournot stability). If the PSNE is not unique, convergence to the set of equilibria is still ensured. It follows, for example, that (a) any strictly quasi-concave supermodular game with a unique PSNE is a best-reply potential game, (b) any strictly ...

This section presents a setup that arises frequently in adverse selection settings and provides conditions on the primitives such that the properties that de…ne a game with monotone selection are satis…ed. The following de…nitions and results (in addition to those in the print appendix) are used: A correspondence : T ! X is increasing in the strong set order if when t > t0, then for each x 2 (t...

The invisible hand theorem relates nothing about the attributes of the optimal allocation vector. In this paper, we identify a convex cone of functions such that order on vectors of exogenous heterogeneity parameters induces component-wise order on allocation vectors for firms in an efficient market. By use of functional analysis, we then replace the vectors of heterogeneities with asymmetries ...

In this paper, we pursue the work of H. Haller and al. (2005, [10]) and examine the existence of equilibrium networks, called Nash networks, in the noncooperative two-way flow model (Bala and Goyal, 2000, [1]) with partner heterogeneous agents. We show through an example that Nash networks do not always exist in such a context. We then restrict the payoff function, in order to find conditions u...

This note extends the results of Frank, Jordán, and Szigeti [1] on parity constrained orientations with connectivity requirements. Given a hypergraph H, a non-negative intersecting supermodular set function p, and a preferred in-degree parity for every node, a formula is given on the minimum number of nodes with wrong in-degree parity in an orientation of H covering p. It is shown that the mini...