A Sigma factor gene which is important in the global regulation of heat shock responses in prokaryotes, rpoH, was isolated from Flexibacter chinesis by PCR, sequenced and compared to the rpoH genes of a variety of other organisms. The rpoH gene was 98% similar to other previously characterized genes. A mutant of rpoH was produced (JR102) which had a reduced growth rate at both low and high temp...

We discuss and examine empirically a firm-level equivalent of the ancient problem of ‘tying the King’s hands’, namely how to avoid managerial intervention that is undertaken to reap private benefits but is harmful to overall value creation, that is, ‘managerial opportunism’. The link from managerial intervention to firm-level value-creation is moderated by employee motivation. Thus, interventio...

Should responsibility for strategic planning and execution be assigned to the same manager? Should a firm have a chief operating officer with responsibilities distinct from those of the chief executive officer? How does the division of labor affect managerial opportunism? This paper uses a formal agency-theoretic model to address these questions and present a new theory of the division of manag...

Syndication has long been a fundamental organizing principle in the entertainment world, but it's been rare elsewhere in business. The fixed physical assets and slow-moving information that characterized the industrial economy made it difficult, if not impossible, to create the kind of fluid networks that are essential for syndication. But with the rise of the information economy, flexible busi...

China has entered a new stage of high-quality economic development, which puts forward in-depth requirements for environmental protection. Companies in heavily polluting industries are required to disclose information. Fulfilling responsibilities and disclosing this information may be either responsible moral act or an opportunistic act. Taking listed companies China’s from 2009 2020 as sample,...

Managerial opportunism is commonly considered as destructive for the parties involved in an agency relationship. Using a formulation close to Jensen and Meckling’s equity model, we consider an agency relationship between a manager and an investor. The latter is assumed to benefit from a market power in terms of external funding opportunities. For high values of the prevailing rate of interest, ...

At times in their interfirm relationships, distribution channel organizations may take advantage of their exchange partners by behaving guilefully. This opportunistic behavior adversely impacts channel member satisfaction (Gassenheimer et al., 1996) as well as the relational exchange norms among channel partners (Gundlach et al., 1995; Sindhav & Lusch, 2008). It also increases transaction costs...