We consider two-stage collective decision problems where some agents have private information about alternatives and others don’t. In the first stage informed (experts) may or not disclose their information, thus eventually influencing preferences of those initially uninformed. second resulting all after disclosure are aggregated by a social choice function. provide general conditions on functi...

The objective of this study is to assess the effects of home country investor protection and ownership structure on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)–mandated internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures by foreign firms that are listed on the U.S. stock exchanges (hereafter referred to as cross-listed firms). Our research question is important for two reasons. First, cross-listed firms have become...

A major concern of statistical agencies is to protect the confidential information contained in data sets that have to be released. The problem is not trivial since the agency has to find an optimal balance between the needs of the users and the needs of the data providers. Ideally the statistical agency should provide maximum information to the users, preserving the privacy of the individual e...

Monitoring (tracking and surveillance) of children's behavior is considered an essential parenting skill. Numerous studies show that well-monitored youths are less involved in delinquency and other normbreaking behaviors, and scholars conclude that parents should track their children more carefully. This study questions that conclusion. We point out that monitoring measures typically assess par...

This paper investigates how perceived vulnerability moderates the effect of privacy calculus on consumerss’ willingness to share information. Consumers’ information disclosure behavior has been primarily studied from “privacy calculus” approach. For example, Kehr et al (2015) defined “privacy calculus” as “a situational-specific trade-off of privacy related risk and benefit perceptions, bounded...