We study the problem of exchange when 1) agents are endowed with heterogeneous indivisible objects, and 2) there is no money. In general, no rule satisfies the three central properties Pareto-efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness [62]. Recently, it was shown that Top Trading Cycles is NP-hard to manipulate [32], a relaxation of strategy-proofness. However, parameterized com...

This paper analyzes the worst-case efficiency ratio of falsename-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. False-nameproofness generalizes strategy-proofness by assuming that a bidder can submit multiple bids under fictitious identifiers. Even the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not false-name-proof. It has previously been shown that there is no false-name-proof mechanism that alway...

In a unified framework of allocation problems with at least three entities (or agents), we show that “generalized proportional rules” are the only rules that are robust to coalitional manipulations. We characterize proportional rules imposing in addition efficiency, dummy, and nonnegativity. Coalitional manipulations are considered both in the environment without any restriction on coalition fo...

Memory caches continue to be a critical component to many systems. In recent years, there has been larger amounts of data into main memory, especially in shared environments such as the cloud. The nature of such environments requires resource allocations to provide both performance isolation for multiple users/applications and high utilization for the systems. We study the problem of fair alloc...

The school choice problem is of great importance both in theory and practice. This paper studies the (student-optimal) top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) an axiomatic way. We introduce two new axioms: MBG (mutual best group)-quota-rationality MBG-robust efficiency. While stability implies MBG-quota rationality, efficiency weaker than robust efficiency, which stronger combination group strategy...

We study mechanisms that operate in interdependent values environments. show when defined on knit and strict environments, only constant can be ex post incentive compatible. Knitness is also necessary for this result to hold with two alternatives the range. For partially we prove compatibility extends groups, strategy-proofness implies strong group special case of private values. The results ex...

For a tolled highway where consecutive sections allow vehicles enter and exit unrestrictedly, we propose a simple toll pricing method. We show that the method is the unique method that satisfies the classical axioms of Additivity and Dummy in the cost sharing literature, and the axioms of Toll Upper Bound for Local Traffic and Routingproofness. We also show that the toll pricing method is the o...

This paper is an attempt to examine the main theorems of social choice theory from the viewpoint of constructive mathematics. We examine the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem [A.F. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica 41 (1973) 587–601; M.A. Satterthwaite, Strategyproofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and soc...