In this paper, we develop a secure multi-attribute procurement auction, in which a sales item is defined by several attributes called qualities, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. We first present a Vickrey-type protocol that can be used for multi-attribute procurement auctions. Next, we show how this protocol can be executed securely. key words :...

Risk management is activity undertaken in an organization to identify and manage threats to achieving organizational objectives. In 2004, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations published its Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework as a structured approach to risk management. Using three pillars of procurement risk management -procurement planning, solicitation and award, and contra...

With the rapid rise of Business to Business (B2B) transactions over the internet and the increasing use of e-procurement solutions by large organizations for purchasing, there is a need to reengineer current legacy supply chain management systems in order to integrate them with modern e-procurement systems. Although there is a great deal of research in the area of integration with e-procurement...

I examine the economic costs and benefits of granting a right of first refusal to one of two bidders in a procurement auction. This right permits the favored bidder to win a contract by matching the bid of the competing bidder. Such a right, is often observed in business interactions, especially procurement. It is commonly thought that the right of first refusal lowers the payoff to the auction...

The Internet opens up new markets for businesses and can thus allow for a significant improvement in procurement. However, this will only apply if the customers are able to handle this huge market. In this paper we show that finding optimal suppliers in B2B marketing is a complex combinatorial problem and present a solution to it. The BestBasket system of Mercateo.com helps customers to handle ...

We document a novel bidding pattern observed in procurement auctions from Japan: winning bids tend to be isolated. We prove that in a general class of models, missing bids robustly indicate non-competitive behavior. In addition, we provide evidence that missing bids coincide tightly with known cartel activity. Finally, we show that missing bids are consistent with efficient collusion in environ...

We investigate the effect of corruption on competition in procurement. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e., the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide an opportunity for bid readjusments in exchange for a bribe. As firms expect to be paying a bribe, a mechanical effect of corruption is to increase the contract price by an amount corresponding to the anticipated brib...