We model a political game where policymaker pledges domestic emissions goal in the context of instrument choice between carbon pricing (CP) and quota approach. show that, although faces an proposed from international environmental agreement, she may pledge more stringent than level. define this as “ambitious goal. that ambitious acts strategy for preempts industry's lobby subsequent stage. also...

Several impatient investors with private costs Ci face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value V is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor i to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, V −Ci. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for this game. A laboratory experiment confirms the model’s main qualitative predictions: competit...

In many settings where spatial preemption might be expected to produce tightly concentrated industry structures, firms share the market instead. Using a strategic investment model, I show that this can be rationalized by heterogeneous brand preferences, which cause new product introductions by incumbent firms to disproportionately cannibalize sales from existing affiliated products. I then pres...