We propose a Spatial Decision Support System (DSS) designed for planners and policy makers which will help them develop effective policy interventions for more liveable and sustainable cities. The DSS will be based on novel high resolution urban simulation models augmented with tools capable of measuring and distinguishing sustainability levels as well as tools that support the decision maker i...

We examine the interrelation between interconnection and competition in the Internet backbone market. Networks that are asymmetric in size choose among different interconnection regimes and compete for end-users. We show that a direct interconnection regime, peering, softens competition as compared to indirect interconnection since asymmetries become less influential when networks peer. If inte...

We re-address the trade-off between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policy makers are subject to capture. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to influence. We find a new informational effect in the political game under centralized structures that gives the policy maker additional bargaining power aga...

A general equilibrium model of a small open economy is developed to analyze the optimal rate of inflation under discretion. Once agents’ welfare is the sole policy objective it is possible to show that openness and inflation no longer have a simple inverse relationship. A greater degree of openness may lead the policy maker to want to exploit the short-run Phillips curve more aggressively, even...

New ideas or technologies are often advocated because of their purported improvements on existing methods. However, what is new is usually less well-known and less widely tested than what is old. New methods may entail greater unknown dangers as well as greater potential advantages. The policy maker who must choose between innovation and convention faces a dilemma of innovation. We present a me...

In this paper, we propose that bounded rationality of another agent be modeled as errors the agent is making while deciding on its action. We are motivated by the work on quantal response equilibria in behavioral game theory which uses Nash equilibria as the solution concept. In contrast, we use decision-theoretic maximization of expected utility. Quantal response assumes that a decision maker ...

We study a decision maker (DM) who has preferences over choice problems, which are sets of payoff allocations between herself and a passive recipient. An example of such a set is the collection of possible allocations in the classic dictator game. The choice of an allocation from the set is observed by the recipient, whereas the choice of the set itself is not. Behaving selfishly under observat...