Suppose bidders may publicly choose not to learn their values prior to a second-price auction with costly bidding. All equilibria with truthful bidding exhibit bidder ignorance when bidders are sufficiently few. Ignorance considerations also affect the optimal reserve price. JEL Codes: D44.

For a stable supply of electricity power plants are required to provide ancillary services in addition to energy production. This paper suggests a solution for optimal bidding strategy for hydroelectric units operating in markets where both energy and ancillary services are priced simultaneously. The model is illustrated on a numerical example of a hydro unit operating in such markets of New Yo...

The orderly deregulation of planned electricity generation and consumption is an important measure for market reform in several countries (such as China), a reasonable proportion the total energy conducive to smooth transition from regulation mode mode. Under plan-market double-track mechanism (PMDM) implemented, modified linear bidding function companies (GCs) first proposed, unified clearing ...

We present a Monte Carlo algorithm for efficiently finding near optimal moves and bids in the game of Bidding Hex. The algorithm is based on the recent solution of Random-Turn Hex by Peres, Schramm, Sheffield, and Wilson together with Richman’s work connecting random-turn games to bidding games.

I analyze a model of a private value divisible good auction with different payment rules, standard rationing rule pro-rata on-the-margin and both with and without a restriction on the number of bids (steps) bidders can submit. I provide characterization of equilibrium bidding strategies in a model with restricted strategy sets and I show that these equilibria converge to some equilibrium of the...

Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents demand bundles of complementary resources, i.e. \I only want B if I also get A". This paper describes iBundle, an ascending-price auction that is guaranteed to compute optimal bundle allocations with agents that follow a best-response bidding strategy. The auction prices bundles directly and allows a...

This paper considers nonparametric estimation of first-price auction models under the monotonicity restriction on the bidding strategy. Based on an integrated-quantile representation of the first-order condition, we propose a tuning-parameter-free estimator for the valuation quantile function. We establish its cube-root-n consistency and asymptotic distribution under weaker smoothness assumptio...

Bilateral contract transaction among generation companies and large consumers is attracting much attention in the electricity market. A large consumer can purchase energy from generation companies directly under a bilateral contract, which can guarantee the economic interests of both sides. However, in pursuit of more profit, the competitions in the transaction exist not only between the compan...