It is well-known that a market equilibrium with uniform prices often does not exist in non-convex day-ahead electricity auctions. We consider the case of the non-convex, uniformprice Pan-European day-ahead electricity market ”PCR” (Price Coupling of Regions), with non-convexities arising from so-called complex and block orders. Extending previous results, we propose a new primal-dual framework ...

In this paper we study the Nash-equilibrium and equilibrium bidding strategies of the Pooled Reverse Auction for troubled assets. The auction was described in (Ausubel & Cramton 2008[1]). We further extend our analysis to a more general class of games which we call Summation Games. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nashequilibrium in these games when the utility functions satisfy a cer...

Inspired by the two-step Shapley value, in this paper we introduce and axiomatize multi-step value for cooperative games with levels structures. Moreover, design a bidding mechanism, which implements strategically subgame perfect Nash equilibrium superadditve games.

We introduce a class of two-player cooperation games where each player faces a binary decision, enter or exit. These games have a unique Nash equilibrium of entry. However, entry imposes a large enough negative externality on the other player such that the unique social optimum involves the player with the higher value to entry entering and the other player exiting. When the game is repeated an...

In this paper, the German electricity wholesale market is modeled by individual profit maximizing agents. The agents use a learning approach called “model predictive bidding” to choose bidding curves for the upcoming day which are sent to the spot market. The chosen bidding curves thereby maximize the agents’ expected discounted profits. In contrast to traditional agent learning approaches such...

Collusion likely has adverse effects on social welfare. In this paper, we study collusion in the e-procurement market Ukraine. We document that bidding patterns data are incompatible with a competitive equilibrium. develop novel structural test to detect pairs and, thereby, networks of collusive firms. validate soundness our detection algorithm sample 863 prosecuted firms participated 23,515 te...

[...] I salute the efforts and agreements being made (in favor of sustainable development) [...] But we must realize that the water crisis and the aggression to the environment is not the cause. The cause is the model of civilization that we have created. And the thing we have to reexamine is our way of life [...] Development cannot go against happiness. It has to work in favor of human happine...

The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), in which each player’s strategy set may depend on the rival players’ strategies. The GNEP has recently drawn much attention because of its capability of modeling a number of interesting conflict situations in, for example, an electricity market and an international pollution contr...

S.Ghaemi , S.M.Moghaddas-Tafreshi K.N.Toosi University of Technology, Tehran, Iran Tel. ++98-09125264952, E-mail: [email protected] , [email protected] Abstract This paper presents an optimized design of grid-connected multi sources hybrid power system includes sources like, photovoltaic array, Electrolyzer, Fuel cell, H2-Tank and grid electricity based on Genetic Algorithm (GA). In...

A short-term electricity market coordinated by a system operator provides a foundation for a competitive electricity market. Combined with long-term contracts for generation and transmission congestion, the spot-market and competitive market pricing can support open access to the transmission grid. INTRODUCTION Electricity market restructuring emphasizes the potential for competition in generat...