We present a protocol that allows voters to phone in their votes. Our protocol makes it expensive for a candidate and a voter to cooperate to prove to the candidate who the voter voted for. When the electoral pool is large enough, the cost to the candidate of manipulating sufficiently many votes to have an influence on the election results becomes impossibly expensive. Hence, the protocol provi...

Applying the theory of voter model and the theory of stopping time, we investigate the statistical properties of the fluctuations of interfaces model that defined from the voter model. We show that the probability distributions of the fluctuations, under some conditions, converge to the corresponding distribution of a geometric Brownian motion. Key-Words: Fluctuation; interface; voter model; st...

We study a family of opinion formation models in one dimension where the propensity for a voter to align with its local environment depends non-linearly on the fraction of disagreeing neighbors. Depending on this non-linearity in the voting rule, the population may exhibit a bias toward zero magnetization or toward consensus, and the average magnetization is generally not conserved. We use a de...

This paper presents a new majority voting technique that combines the two basic modalities of Web images textual and visual features of image in a re-annotation and search based framework. The proposed framework considers each web page as a voter to vote the relatedness of keyword to the web image, the proposed approach is not only pure combination between image low level feature and textual fe...

This paper proposes a SPICE model development methodology for quantum-dot cellular automata (QCA) cells and presents a SPICE model for QCA cells. The model is validated by simulating the basic logic gates such as inverter and majority voter. The proposed model makes it possible to design and simulate QCA combinational circuits and hybrid circuits of QCA and other NANO devices using SPICE. In th...

The -core in Euclidean spatial voting is the set of points that cannot be dislodged by a point more than closer to a simple majority of voter ideal points. If is greater than the yolk radius of the set, then the -core is nonempty. If exceeds twice the yolk radius, then there are no global intransitivities and any sequence of proposals starting from x will reach the -core from x in at most ||x||...

Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exogenously given and non decomposable alternatives. Often, on the contrary, choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles made of many interdependent components. In this paper we present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of ...

A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of...

Consider a long-range, one-dimensional voter model started with all zeroes on the negative integers and all ones on the positive integers. If the process obtained by identifying states that are translations of each other is positively recurrent, then it is said that the voter model exhibits interface tightness. In 1995, Cox and Durrett proved that one-dimensional voter models exhibit interface ...

We report experiments on the following lobbying game. Two lobbyists have identical budgets and simultaneously distribute them across voters in a legislature. Each voter votes for the lobbyist who pays them most and the lobbyist who receives most votes wins a prize. Taking the share of the budget distributed to a voter as a measure of the voter‟s voting power we investigate how voting power vari...