نتایج جستجو برای: information theoretic limits

تعداد نتایج: 1284145  

2010
Tracey Ho

any features in modern networks have their roots in technologies developed for the Internet. The recent concept of network coding is an exception; and goes beyond traditional forwarding of immutable packets, viewing network operation instead as flows of information that can be operated on mathematically within the network. In particular, network nodes may perform mathematical operations across ...

Journal: :I. J. Network Security 2006
Garimella Rama Murthy

Zhong et al. formulated the problem of disclosing credentials (associated with privacy) for building trust in an open environment like Internet. Thus, one form of privacy-trust problem is formulated in [17]. In [17], an entropy measure is defined to quantify privacy loss. In this research paper, by a proper formulation (modelling), the privacy-trust tradeoff is attacked from the Information The...

Journal: :Applied optics 1997
M A Neifeld W C Chou

We derive the information theoretic limit to storage capacity in volume holographic optical memories for the limiting cases of dominant intensity noise (Gaussian noise) and dominant field noise (Rician noise). These capacity bounds are compared with the performance achievable using simple Reed-Solomon error-correcting codes.

2000
Moni Naor Benny Pinkas

This work describes distributed protocols for oblivious transfer, in which the role of the sender is divided between several servers, and a chooser (receiver) must contact a threshold of these servers in order to run the oblivious transfer protocol. These distributed oblivious transfer protocols provide information theoretic security, and do not require the parties to compute exponentiations or...

Journal: :CoRR 2014
Reevana Balmahoon A. J. Han Vinck Ling Cheng

Correlated sources are present in communication systems where protocols ensure that there is some predetermined information for sources to transmit. Here, two correlated sources across a channel with eavesdroppers are investigated, and conditions for perfect secrecy when some channel information and some source data symbols (the predetermined information) have been wiretapped are determined. Th...

2005
Matt Lepinski

We show that any function f can be securely evaluated by a protocol with ballots and a ballot box. That is, n mutually suspicious players, each player i possessing a secret input xi, can use ballots and ballot boxes to jointly evaluate f(x1, . . . , xn) = (y1, . . . , yn), so that (no matter how many players may collude and deviate from their prescribed instructions, and no matter how long they...

2003
Roman Tzschoppe Robert Bäuml Johannes B. Huber André Kaup

Universal blind steganalysis attempts to detect steganographic data without knowledge about the applied steganographic system. Farid proposed such a detection algorithm based on higher-order statistics for separating original images from stego images. His method shows an astonishing performance on current steganographic schemes. Starting from the statistical approach in Farid’s algorithm, we in...

Journal: :IEEE Trans. Information Theory 2003
Neri Merhav

We consider the Shannon cipher system with a variable key rate, and study the necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect secrecy in the sense that the exponential rate of the probability of breaking into the system would not be improved by observing the cryptogram. For a memoryless plaintext source, we derive achievable lower bounds on the number of key bits needed for almost every plainte...

2009
Arpita Patra Ashish Choudhury C. Pandu Rangan

We re-visit the problem of secure multiparty set intersection in information theoretic settings. In [16], Li et.al have proposed a protocol for multiparty set intersection problem with n parties, that provides information theoretic security, when t < n 3 parties are corrupted by an active adversary having unbounded computing power. In [16], the authors claimed that their protocol takes six roun...

2005
Matt Lepinski Sergei Izmalkov

We show that any function f can be securely evaluated by a protocol with ballots and a ballot box. That is, n mutually suspicious players, each player i possessing a secret input xi, can use ballots and ballot boxes to jointly evaluate f(x1, . . . , xn) = (y1, . . . , yn), so that (no matter how many players may collude and deviate from their prescribed instructions, and no matter how long they...

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