In applications of theories of incentives, the information known privately by an economic agent is represented by a point in a Euclidean space. Other agents know the probability distribution of this point, but not its realization, which is called the agent’s type. For models of this sort, designs of optimal incentive schemes present few difficulties when agents’ types are one-dimensional. The c...

One important task in current and future communication networks is to define a suitable pricing scheme. It is then preferable to formulate a mathematical model, so that parameters will be optimized and important properties such as fairness or truthful anticipated load revelation (or incentive compatibility) will be verified. In this paper we study a simple and promising scheme called the cumulu...

Wenzhou's industry-university-research system suffers from poor matching of resource supply and demand, inefficient symbiosis model insufficient support the external policy environment, presenting a symbiotic state "biased symbiosis-intermittent symbiosis". The suggestions for optimization are to build based on compatibility quality quantity resources, integration industry-university-research, ...

When agents have quasi-linear preferences, every incentive compati-ble social choice function can be implemented by a simple extensive form mech-anism, even if agents are allowed to use mixed strategies. The second stage of themechanism, which is used to elicit the agents' true preferences, is not reached inequilibrium; it gives agents strict dominant strategies, so equilibrium ...

We consider the class of Bayesian environments with one-dimensional private signals and interdependent valuations. For these environments, we fully characterize the set of interim efficient mechanisms which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. In these mechanisms, the allocation rules assign probability one to an alternative that maximizes the ...

This paper focuses on reverse auction mechanisms that may involve continuum values of different types of goods, general nonconvex constraints, and second stage costs. Our analysis seeks to address the payment rules and the conditions under which the coalitions of participants cannot influence the auction outcome in order to obtain higher collective utility. Under the dominant-strategy incentive...

The incentive power market may lead to a high information cost if it is not informationally efficient. The paper analyzes the characteristic of the generation side power market mechanism model based on the designing economic mechanisms theory by the three GENCOs (Generation Companies) case. The result of analysis is that the mechanism model has four main features: the informationally efficient ...

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established under the Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized Annex I countries to offset part of their domestic emissions by investing in emissions-reduction projects in developing non-Annex I countries. We present a novel CDM modeling framework which can be used in computable-general-equilibrium (CGE) models to quantify the sector-specific and macroeconomic ...

Under many distributed protocols, the prescribed behavior for participants is to behave greedily, i.e., to repeatedly“best respond” to the others’ actions. We present recent work (Proc. ICS’11 ) where we tackle the following general question: “When is it best for a long-sighted participant to adhere to a distributed greedy protocol?”. We take a game-theoretic approach and exhibit a class of gam...

We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of goods they may receive. We refer to such valuations as capacitated and seek mechanisms that maximize social welfare and are simultaneously incentive compatible, envy-free, individually rational, and have no positive transfers. If capacities are infinite, then sequentially repeating the 2nd price Vickrey auctio...