We study how to efficiently motivate policy-makers solve political multitask problems. Political problems typically have some outcomes that are difficult measure. Moreover, there conflicts among citizens about optimal policies and the power tax invest in better for tasks. develop a agency model with two tasks only one measurable outcome. In such an environment, choose socially inefficient publi...

BACKGROUND Maximizing response rates is critically important in order to provide the most generalizable and unbiased research results. High response rates reduce the chance of respondents being systematically different from non-respondents, and thus, reduce the risk of results not truly reflecting the study population. Monetary incentives are often used to improve response rates, but little is ...

BACKGROUND General Practitioners (GPs) respond poorly to postal surveys. Consequently there is potential for reduced data quality and bias in the findings. In general population surveys, response to postal questionnaires may be improved by reducing their length and offering incentives. The aim of this study was to investigate whether questionnaire length and/or the offer of an incentive improve...

BACKGROUND Financial incentive interventions have been suggested as one method of promoting healthy behaviour change. OBJECTIVES To conduct a systematic review of the effectiveness of financial incentive interventions for encouraging healthy behaviour change; to explore whether effects vary according to the type of behaviour incentivised, post-intervention follow-up time, or incentive value. ...

The paper shows that the principal can enhance her control over the agent’s human capital by acquiring the physical capital that is critical for him to create value. However, the enhancement in the control necessarily reduces his incentive to make human capital investment ex ante and to exert e¤ort ex post. This trade-o¤ between control and incentive thus decides the boundary of the …rm. The pa...

Consider an arbitrary Bayesian decision problem in which the preferences of each agent are private information. We prove that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints typically decrease when the decision problem is linked with independent copies of itself. This is established by first defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their representations of preferences so that th...