Consider two sellers each of whom has one unit of an indivisible good and two buyers each of whom is interested in buying one unit. The sellers simultaneously set reserve prices and use second-price auctions as rationing device. An equilibrium in pure strategies where each seller has a regular customer is characterized. The result is applied in order to demonstrate that not allowing sellers to ...

The market power of the incumbents means that average pool prices are set by the costs of entry. Reforms which raise entry costs will be proposed and should be resisted. Reforms to capacity payments may have little effect on prices, but could affect system security. The values of VOLL and LOLP appear grossly incorrect, and if changed might affect reserve margins and the allocation of investment...

We examine the effects of unconventional monetary policy surprises on the value of the dollar using high-frequency intraday data and contrast them with the effects of conventional policy tools. Identifying monetary policy surprises from changes in interest rate future prices in narrow windows around policy announcements, we find that monetary policy surprises since the Federal Reserve lowered i...

We consider a model of resource dependence where only the seller knows the resource reserve. The model captures phenomena such as trust in the relationship and “bribing” for continuation through generous supplies. It also explains supply shocks in equilibrium: privately informed sellers have incentives to reveal their types too late through a supply disruption after which their exploit the cons...

Following an analysis of the relation between a standard Steindlian model of stagnation and Steindl’s own analysis, we modify the standard model by introducing endogenous changes in the markup and a reformulation of the investment function. These extensions, which address significant weaknesses of the standard model, find support in Steindl’s writing and leave intact some of Steindl’s key resul...

We show that an auctioneer may prefer to restrict entry by exacting an admission fee to having an extra potential bidder in an auction setting with endogenous bidder entry. We also highlight that admission fees and reserve prices are different instruments in a setting with uncertainty over entry costs, and that optimal mechanisms in such settings may be higher-dimensional than in Myerson (1981)...

This paper investigates empirically the relationship between the pattern of fiscal policy and the demand for international reserves in developing countries, and how this relationship is associated with political risk and conditional access to global capital markets. It finds evidence that for developing countries with low political risk, countercyclical (procyclical) fiscal policies are associa...

In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we allow for a general meeting technology and show that its properties crucially affect the mechanism that sellers select in equilibrium. In general, it is optimal for sellers to post an auction without a reserve price but with a fee, paid by all buyers who meet with the seller. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technolog...

Any announcement from the Federal Reserve has a huge impact on the interest rate markets. The press releases from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) are major inputs to the market and the random intervention model is applied to interest rate futures transaction data to measure FOMC announcement impact. Missing prices during non-trading time periods are imputed iteratively during the estim...

The Federal Reserve adjusts the federal funds target rate discretely, causing discontinuity in short-term interest rates. Unlike Poisson jumps, these adjustments are well anticipated by the market. We propose a term structure model that incorporates an anticipated jump component with known arrival times but random jump size. We find that doing so improves the model performance in capturing the ...