The facility location game is an extensively studied problem in mechanism design. In the classical model, cost of each agent her distance to nearest facility. this paper, we consider a novel model where charges entrance fee, which function facility's location. Thus, our sum and fee generalized captures more real-life scenarios. can be arbitrary function, corresponding preferences agents may not...

The Dynamic Facility Location problem is a generalization of the classic problem, in which distance metric between clients and facilities changes over time. Such metrics that develop as function time are usually called “evolving metrics”, thus can be alternatively interpreted evolving metrics. objective this time-dependent variant to balance trade-off optimizing stability solution, modeled by c...

We initiate the study of heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. mainly focus on fundamental case where a set agents are positioned in line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input positions agents, chooses to locate single based this information. mechanisms that aim maximize social welfare (the total utility d...

We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such setting, we have set agents and facilities. Each agent is located on line has an preference over the Our goal to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit truthful information (preferences and/or locations) from locate facilities minimize both maximum total cost objectives as well maximize minimum utility o...