We study coalition formation problems with externalities. prove that, if expectations are not prudent a stable coalitions structure may fail to exist. Under and efficient exists the set of admissible is single-lapping. However, under this assumption singleton, no strategy-proof revelation mechanism exists, differently from case without Finally, correspondence Nash implementable.

Most of the existing algorithms for fair division do not consider externalities. Under externalities, utility an agent depends only on its allocation but also other agents’ allocation. An has a positive (negative) value assigned goods (chores). This work studies special case externality which we refer to as 2-D. In 2-D, receives or negative unassigned items independent who them. We propose simp...

The purpose of this paper is to establish if Marshallian and Jacobian knowledge spillovers affect job creation in the green energy sector. Whether these two effects exist important for number jobs created related fields pushed away other sectors. In analysis, production efficiency, terms spillovers, from inventions solar, wind explored through data envelopment analysis (DEA), based on Malmquist...