Evolutionary dynamics in games imply de–facto spiteful behavior of the players: In order to ‘survive’ the evolutionary process, players must perform better than their opponents. This means they maximize relative rather than absolute payoffs. The paper shows that there is a class of games resulting in different equilibria if played by maximizers of absolute or of relative payoffs, respectively. ...

We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. ...

Cooperation is ubiquitous in the real world, ranging from biological systems to economic and social systems. Evolutionary game theory has been considered an important approach to characterizing and understanding the emergence of cooperative behavior in systems consisting of selfish individuals. In this paper, we review some of our works about dynamics of evolutionary games over complex networks...

Artificially intelligent opponents in commercial computer games are almost exclusively controlled by manuallydesigned scripts. With increasing game complexity, the scripts tend to become quite complex too. As a consequence they often contain “holes” that can be exploited by the human player. The research question addressed in this paper reads: How can evolutionary learning techniques be applied...

We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility. Our Choquet expected utility model allows for both an opt...

Stochastic evolutionary games often share a dynamic property called punctuated equilibrium; this means that their sample paths exhibit long periods of stasis near one population state which are infrequently interrupted by switching events after which the sample paths stay close to a different population state, again for a long period of time. This has been described in the literature as a favor...

This paper shows random migration induced synchronized emergence of cooperation in interconnected subpopulations playing chaotic replication-selection evolutionary games where altruism is mildly incentivized.

We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games.

We demonstrate generating complete and playable card games using evolutionary algorithms. Card games are represented in a previously devised card game description language, a context-free grammar. The syntax of this language allows us to use grammar-guided genetic programming. Candidate card games are evaluated through a cascading evaluation function, a multi-step process where games with undes...

In the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, the individuals of a population meet each other at random, and they have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions. Here we remove these simplifying assumptions. We introduce a new model, where individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivi...