We propose an abstract framework to analyse the rationality of change operators deened in a syntactical way. More precisely we propose \syntactical" postulates of rationality stemming from AGM ones. Then we introduce ve change operators based on forward chaining. Finally we apply our abstract framework to analyse the rationality of our operators.

Models in the classical theory of games and in neoclassical economics normally assume rationality in the sense that agents have compete and transitive preferences. The paper labels this fundamental rationality and distinguishs two other sorts of rationality pertinent to the study of strategic interaction: individual economic rationality (IER) and effective rationality. IER is, we observe, chara...

Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through one game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a new attitude to modeling will be presented in game theory as dynamic system of strategic games and its some applications such as analysis of the clash betwe...