Using the bluffing dice game Dudo as a challenge domain, we abstract information sets using imperfect recall of actions. Even with such abstraction, the standard Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) algorithm proves impractical for Dudo, with the number of recursive visits to the same abstracted information sets increasing exponentially with the depth of the game graph. By holding strategie...

We consider a propositional dynamic logic whose programs are regular expressions over game strategy pairs. At the atomic level, these are finite extensive form game trees with structured strategy specifications, whereby a player’s strategy may depend on properties of the opponent’s strategy. The advantage of imposing structure not merely on games or on strategies but on game strategy pairs, is ...

We propose strategic games wherein the strategies consist of players asking each other questions and answering those questions. We study simplifications of such games wherein two players simultaneously ask each other a question that the opponent is then obliged to answer. The motivation for our research is to model conversation including the dynamics of questions and answers, to provide new lin...

Traffic accidents are often caused by improper lane changes. Although the safety of lane-changing has attracted extensive attention in vehicle and traffic fields, there few studies considering lateral comfort users decision-making. Lane-changing decision-making single-step dynamic game with incomplete information path planning based on Bézier curve proposed this paper to coordinate performance ...

We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling raise significantly above static complete Nash levels even when the privately observed variables are restricted lie in narrow ranges. calibrate our using data from beer industr...

Recently, empirical industrial organization economists have proposed estimators for dynamic games of incomplete information. In these models, agents choose from a finite number actions and maximize expected discounted utility in a Markov perfect equilibrium. Previous econometric methods estimate the probability distribution of agents’ actions in a first stage. In a second step, a finite vector ...