We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated private valuations and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets. JEL Classification: C62, C72, D44, D82

In this paper, we study the significance of the cognitive capacity in the context of double auction experiments. These experiments are then simulated using artificial agents in an agent-based modeling environment, and the results are compared with the results from human subjects.

This paper builds on previous papers describing our ongoing research in automated market-mechanism design: using a genetic algorithm (GA) to find optimal parameter-settings for softwareagent traders that operate in virtual “e-marketplaces”, where the rules of the marketplaces are also under simultaneous control of the GA. The aim is that the GA automatically designs new agentbased e-marketplace...

The original analysis of sponsored search auctions by Varian and independently by Aggarwal et al. did not take into account the notion of reserve prices, which are common across all major search engines. We investigate this further and show that the separability assumption derived by Aggarwal et al. is not sufficient for aligning the greedy allocation employed by GSP and the efficient allocatio...

Abstract By transferring power-hungry huge data centers to lightweight Internet of Things (IoT) mobile devices, edge computing (MEC) has completely changed the IoT. For MEC, optimize economic gains and motivate profit-oriented entities, joint resource allocation network economics problem must be solved, issue is limited by local constraints, namely, server only serves multiple nearby which rest...