This study explores corporate governance practices within the context of the Nigerian banking industry using instances of corporate governance lapses that resulted in part to the Nigerian banking crises. We present multiple case analysis of publicly available documents and court papers (in the United Kingdom and Nigeria) to document instances of breach and areas of weakness in the existing Nige...

We present a model in which wage-setting structures explain cross-country variation in corporate governance. The model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the levels of firm ownership concentration and investor protection legislation. Low and high degrees of centralization yield less concentrated ownership and more investo...

Prepared for the Handbook Of New Institutional Economics. Focusing on firm behavior, the paper examines the collapse of socialist institutions, the building of capitalist institutions, changing firm boundaries, transactional governance, corporate governance, and use of the legal system. The contrast between law's use in transactions and its relative ineffectiveness in corporate governance sugge...

This paper intends to reexamine commonly accepted view on association of legal rules with corporate governance and financial markets. It summarizes findings of a number of empirical studies and gives view of current thinking on association between legal rules and financial systems characterized by ownership patterns, nature of equity, governance structure, finance behavior and capital structure...

The separation of ownership and control in corporations opens up the potential for moral hazard. Thus it is conventional wisdom that managers who are not closely monitored pursue personal goals rather then maximize shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about what these goals are, despite the importance of understanding manager behavior when designing corporate governance rules. This paper pro...

The separation of ownership and control in corporations opens up the potential for moral hazard. Thus it is conventional wisdom that managers who are not closely monitored pursue personal goals rather than maximize shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about what these goals are, despite the importance of understanding manager behavior when designing corporate governance rules. This paper pro...

(1997) and the references therein for more information on the Japanese system of corporate governance. C orporate governance mechanisms assure investors in corporations that they will receive adequate returns on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737). If these mechanisms did not exist or did not function properly, outside investors would not lend to firms or buy equity in them. B...

This paper applies a two-stage, double bootstrapping data envelope analysis (DEA) approach to investigate whether and to what extent various distinctive corporate governance practices affect productive efficiency in a sample of 461 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2002. We find that firm efficiency is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to...

"Corporate governance" includes mechanisms to monitor CEO's performance assure efficient decision adoption and maximize firm value. One of the most effective aspects is degree risk-taking. This study investigates relationship between CEO power institutional ownership with risk-taking behavior member firms Tehran Stock Exchange Iran Fara Bourse during 2010-2019 by utilizing quintile regression. ...

This study validates some aspects of agency theory, resource dependency and organization theory referring to the Sri Lankan context. The sample includes 205 non-financial listed firms prepared in a balanced panel for six years. Implications are provided insufficiency financial variables predicting corporate distress. Financial together with governance jointly enhance predictive power Less likelih...