We develop a criterion for coalition formation among goal-directed agents, the indecomposable do-ut-des property. The indecomposable do-ut-des property refines the do-ut-des property (literally give to get) by considering the fact that agents prefer to form coalitions whose components cannot be formed independently. A formal description of this property is provided as well as an analysis of alg...

regarding the recent development in lng production and transportation, lng exports would exhibit a pivotal role in the future of global gas trade. by analyzing the geographical pattern of the world lng trade and the structure of its transportation costs, the lng cost matrix for forum's exporters to main lng importers is presented. using this matrix, the cooperation amongst the forum's...

The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We characterize this relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We assume that whenever a set of agents form a coalition to achieve a goal, they share their knowledge before acting. Based on this assumption, we propose new semantics for a...

Hedonic games model cooperative where agents desire to form coalitions, and only care about the composition of coalitions which they are members. Focusing on various classes dichotomous hedonic games, each agent either approves or disapproves a given coalition, we propose random extension, players have an independent participation probability. We initiate research computational complexity compu...

We introduce the notion of a stable winning coalition in a multiplayer game as a new system of classification of games. An axiomatic refinement of this classification for three-player games is also presented. These classifications are compared in light of a probabilistic model and the existing literature.

In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. In a game of endogenous coalition formation, I show that voting blocs form in equilibrium, and in an assembly with two parties I show how the incentives to join a bloc...