We conducted an experiment to explore the time-consistency of risk preferences in a multi-period betting game. Specifically, subjects planned their contingent betting decisions in advance then played the game dynamically later to determine whether their respective decisions matched. We found that subjects took more risk than planned in their initial bet and after losses. In addition, this incre...

We propose a model of posted prices in networks. The model maps traditional concepts of market power, competition and double marginalization into networks, allowing for the study of pricing in complex structures of intermediation, such as supply chains, transportation and communication networks and financial brokerage. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium prices. Our experiment...

Auctions allow regulators to identify land management changes with substantial environmental benefit and low opportunity cost. This paper reports an experiment in which seller subjects compete in sealed-offer auctions to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the experimenter-regulator to subsidize pollution abatement. One treatment employs uniform-price auction rules, whereas another treat...

This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. In particular we seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction over a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution with bidders choosing it overwhelmingly often when entry prices for the two auctions are the same. Whe...

A theoretical framework is presented to explain how agents respond to information under uncertainty in contingent valuation surveys. Agents are provided with information signals and referendum prices as part of the elicitation process. Agents use Bayesian updating to revise prior distributions. An information prompt is presented to reduce hypothetical bias. However, we show the interaction betw...

It has been well-recognized that markets can aggregate less-than-perfect information across market participants. With two differently designed securities, this work examines the impact of security design on the information aggregation ability of markets in laboratory experiments. Results show that markets with one security aggregate information significantly better than markets with the other s...

This paper explores the criterion validity of stated preference methods through experimental referenda that capture key characteristics of a stated preference survey for a proposed environmental program. In particular, we investigate whether advisory referenda, where participant votes have either known or unknown weight in the policy decision, can elicit values comparable to that of a standard,...

Internet experiments are a new and convenient way for reaching a large subject pool. Yet, providing incentives to subjects can be a tricky design issue. One cost—effective and simple method is the publication of a high score (as in computer games). We test whether a high score provides adequate and non—distortionary incentives by comparing it to the usual performance based incentives. We find s...

We examine in controlled experiments how individuals make choices when faced with multiple options. The choice tasks mimic the selection of health insurance, prescription drug, or retirement savings plans. However, in our experiment, the available options can be objectively ranked. We find that the probability of a person selecting the optimal option declines as the number of options increases,...

While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how “the shadow of the future” affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite rep...