Two bookmakers compete in Bertrand fashion while setting odds on the outcomes of a sporting contest where an influential punter (or betting syndicate) may bribe some player(s) to fix the contest. Zero profit and bribe prevention may not always hold together. When the influential punter is quite powerful, the bookies may coordinate on prices and earn positive profits for fear of letting the ‘lem...

Existing microstructure literature cannot explain the empirical evidence that bid-ask spreads can decrease with information asymmetry and ignores either information asymmetry or inventory risks. We develop a market making model that highlights the asset pricing impact of market makers’ capability of making offsetting trades in markets where both information asymmetry and inventory risk are sign...

We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal–agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to part...

We show that one of the main results in Chen and Sönmez (2006, 2008) [6,7] does no longer hold when the number of recombinations is sufficiently increased to obtain reliable conclusions. No school choice mechanism is significantly superior in terms of efficiency. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C70; C13; C91

Collective choices are often cyclic and cannot be rationalized by a well-defined linear ordering. In this paper we identify conditions under which collective choices, potentially cyclic, can be rationalized by extensive games with perfect information. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D70

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function. JEL Classification: C70, D11, D80

The concept of stability á la J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, which is composed of a pair of internal and external stability requirements, formalizes the idea of standard of behavior. This paper studies the decisiontheoretic foundation of stability, by establishing some epistemic conditions for a “stable” pattern of behavior in the context of strategic interaction. JEL Classification: C70, C...

Clinical disease associated with porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) infection in naïve pigs is well chronicled; however, information on endemic PEDV infection is limited. To characterize chronic PEDV infection, the duration of infectious virus shedding and development of protective immunity was determined. On Day 0 (D0), a growing pig was challenged with PEDV and 13 contacts were commingled...