We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. Our analysis uses a backward induction procedure to pinpoint...

We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supplychains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without payments and ...

We study a double auction with two-sided private information and preplay Ž communication, for which Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983, J. Econ. Theory 28, . 265 281 showed that all equilibria are inefficient and the Chatterjee Samuleson linear equilibrium is most efficient. Like several others, we find that players use communication to surpass equilibrium levels of efficiency, especially when the ...

The Network Formation problem has received increasing attention in recent years. Previous works have addressed this problem considering only networks designed by sel sh users, which can be consistently suboptimal. This paper addresses the network formation issue using cooperative game theory, which permits to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among agents. Both the Nash bargaining s...

We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is determined only by her own strategy and does not depend on actions taken by other players. We show that the equilibrium outcome in one-way games without payments and...

This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities. Within this framework we propose a new value that extends the Shapley value to partition function form games, the so-called Rational Belief Shapley (RBS) value. We investigate the strategic foundation of the RBS value by constructing an implementation mechanism. Th...

We model bargaining situations in which parties have the option to terminate the negotiation, resulting in a termination outcome that depends on the offers made in the negotiation phase. The key features of the model are that 1) making a concession in the negotiation phase increases the other party’s termination option payoff and 2) the termination outcome induces an efficiency loss as compared...

In two recent contributions, Herbert Gintis introduces agent-based imitation models built upon evolutionary bargaining games where agents use private prices as strategies. He reports surprising convergence results for simulations performed in exchange economies where goods are strict complement. We investigate analytically these results using the notion of stochastic stability.

1. The Problem and Related Literature In our daily lives, we always face decisions to make and alternative actions to choose overtime. Traditional economic analysis expects people behave rationally (take actions maximizing their payoff or utility) and thus behave consistently (following the original contingent plan or strategy) when they make these decisions. In other words, a rational agent's ...