China is entering a period of rapid urban development. With the rapid expansion of cities, a large number of peasants have lost their land as a result. Given the development of urbanization, safeguarding the rights and interests of land-lost peasants in the process of urbanization has become a new topic of interest in China. In this study, based on game theory, we analyze the interests of the l...

Policy-making is a dynamic process in which policies can be changed in each period but continue in the absence of new legislation. We study a dynamic legislative bargaining game with an endogenous status quo where in each period a dollar is allocated with a proposal voted against the allocation in the previous period. We characterize for any initial status quo a class of simple Markov perfect e...

The paper analyzes the impact of a two-level game for water allocations. For a model with two domestic groups and two countries, and with both domestic and international negotiations, Nash bargaining theory is used to derive several propositions on the consequences of different bargaining rules for water allocations. The effect on international negotiations of the ability to commit to having do...

This paper examines the reorganization process under Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code. We model the strategic interaction between claimants under Chapter 11 as a multiple-stage costly bargaining process, and solve it in a game theory setting. Using a structural framework, we show that our model generates di¤erent ranges of equilibrium strategies: reorganization, liquidation and continuati...

this paper shows how game theory can be applied to modeling the interaction between government and manufacturer in implementation of cleaner production. a generic game model based upon ‘two-person non-cooperative’ static game is created to allow various strategic actions being tested by stages, and aid decision making by selecting optimal strategy for both manufacturer and policy maker to reduc...

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between withingroup and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are ch...

This paper investigates whether information about generosity or fairness can be useful in reducing dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency. Subjects were first screened using a dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participants into two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, with a dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification r...

The dominant theoretical perspective guiding research on economic sanctions views as tools of bargaining. This implies that senders and targets are engaged in strategic interaction each is basing its decisions, part, expectations regarding how opponent will react. In this paper, we test a number hypotheses derived from game-theoretic model developed by Morgan Miers (1999) focus specifically the...

Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are first elicited in a preliminary phase, and then bargaining begins. I show that although subjects are ...

The paper investigates the reactive bargaining set, a solution con­ cept for TU-games introduced by Granot (1994), in economies in which agents exchange indivisible goods and one perfectly divisible good (money). Under the assumptions that the preferences of the agents are quasi-linear and the initial endowments satisfy the Total Abundance condition, which is an abundance con­ dition on the mon...