When matching mechanisms yield assignments that are not stable, offers unravel, and, eventually, participants abandon the match. This logic is thought to provide a reasonable explanation of why, empirically, the stable Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism persists where non-stable alternatives, such as Priority mechanisms, are abandoned. Theory, however, tells us that both Deferred Acceptance (DA...

This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005, American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy’s data cannot reject the hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as lying induces...

This paper reinterprets the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005, American Economic Review). We show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the simple hypothesis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This implies that so long as ...

This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision-rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. The uninformed principal makes a price offer to the agent who then decides either to accept or to reject the offer. Contrary to the prediction the Coase Theorem provides, actions induced in the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium do not always satisfy ex-post...

This paper studies how a sender with private information can influence the decisionmaker through well informed intermediaries. Both the sender and the intermediary may be independently objective or biased: with the objective type assumed to pass on the most accurate information while the biased type wanting to push a particular agenda but also to appear objective. Although using one’s own infor...

This article is an attempt to draw on James Baldwin’s depiction of white identity as the “the lie whiteness” tease out a nascent ethics that centers role genuine, honest confrontation with this so-called “lie.” In order connect dots between excavation whiteness and provinces religious ethics, we will explore truth-telling plays in form something like notion confession, limiting our engagement c...

Young children understand that lying is wrong, yet little is known about the emotions children connect to the acts of lying and confessing and how children's emotion expectancies relate to real-world behavior. In the current study, 4- to 9-year-old children (N=48) heard stories about protagonists (a) committing transgressions, (b) failing to disclose their misdeeds, and (c) subsequently lying o...

Information elicitation mechanisms, such as Peer Prediction [11] and Bayesian Truth Serum [12], are designed to reward agents for honestly reporting their private information, even when this information cannot be directly verified. Information elicitation mechanisms, such as these, are cleverly designed so that truth-telling is a strict Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. However, a key challenge that h...

School authorities in the UK and US advocate use of lotteries to desegregate schools. We study a school choice mechanism employed Berlin where lottery quota is embedded immediate acceptance (IA) mechanism, compare it deferred (DA) with quota. In both mechanisms, some seats are allocated based on academic achievement (e.g., grades), while randomly. find that, theory, strengthens truth-telling DA...