We exhibit a triangulated category which is neither the stable category of a Frobenius category nor a full triangulated subcategory of the homotopy category of a stable model category.

We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not show this property. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

We suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game. D 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The aim of the present paper is to study several solution concepts for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao [1], we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The firs result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value. Next, we define the co...

In this note we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2015).

If a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo [9]. We introduce axioms of invariance from player deletion in presence of a special player. In particular, if the special player is a nullifyi...

We show that for every cooperative game a corresponding set game can be defined, called the standard set game. Values for set games can be applied to this standard game and determine allocations for the cooperative game. On the other hand, notions for cooperative games, like the Shapley value, the τ−value or the core can be considered in the context of the standard set games.

In this paper a methodology for design of stabilizing control for high order system via reduced order model is presented. In the first part a method is proposed for the reduction of original higher order passive system to a lower order stable model, using this reduced order model, a strictly passive controller of order equal to that of reduced order model is designed. It is shown that this lowe...