For selling spectrum licenses economists have designed new auction types proceeding over several rounds and offering several licenses simultaneously. Communication between bidders usually is forbidden to prevent collusions (i.e., through separate compartments and supervision). We investigate these auctions from the cryptographic point of view and identify that the usual implementation by a succ...

We survey the recent European UMTS license auctions and compare their outcomes with the predictions of a simple model that emphasizes future market structure as a main determinant of valuations for licenses. Since the main goal of most spectrum allocation procedures is economic e¢ciency, and since consumers (who are a¤ected by the ensuing market structure) do not participate at the auction stag...

Combinatorial auctions address the fundamental problem of allocating multiple items in the presence of complex bidder preferences including complements or substitutes. They have found application in public and private sector auctions. Many real-world markets involve the sale of a large number of items, limiting the direct application of combinatorial auctions due to both computational intractab...

We design truthful double spectrum auctions where multiple parties can trade spectrum based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing spectrum owners (as sellers) to lease their selected idle spectrum to new spectrum users, and provides new users (as buyers) the spectrum they desperately need. The most significant challenge is how to make the auction econ...

Strategy() AbstractStrategy(in agent: AbstractTradingAgent) endOfRound(in auction: Auction) eventOccurred(in event: AuctionEvent) getAgent(): AbstractTradingAgent initialise() modifyShout(in shout: Shout, in auction: Auction): Shout modifyShout(in shout: MutableShout): boolean protoClone(): Object reset() setAgent(in agent: AbstractTradingAgent) AbstractStrategy determineQuantity(in auction: Au...